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I analyze the equilibrium in a labor market where ﬁrms oﬀer wage-tenure contracts
to direct the search of employed and unemployed workers. Each applicant observes
all oﬀers and there is no coordination among individuals. Workers’ applications
(as well as ﬁrms’ recruiting decisions) are optimal. This optimality requires the
equilibrium to be formulated diﬀerently from the that in the literature of undirected
search. I provide such a formulation and show that the equilibrium exists. In the
equilibrium, individuals explicitly tradeoﬀ between an oﬀer and the matching rate
at that oﬀer. This tradeoﬀ yields a unique oﬀer which is optimal for each worker to
apply, and applicants are separated endogenously according to their current values.
Despite such uniqueness and separation, there is a non-degenerate and continuous
wage distribution of employed workers in the stationary equilibrium. The density
of this distribution is increasing at low wages and decreasing at high wages. In
all equilibrium contracts, wages increase with tenure, which results in quit rates to
decrease with tenure. Moreover, the model makes novel predictions about individuals’
job-to-job transition and comparative statics.
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Directed search is a matching process in which an individual can use his oﬀer to aﬀect his
matching rate. The objective of this paper is to study the equilibrium in a labor market
where ﬁrms oﬀer wage-tenure contracts to direct workers’ search. A wage-tenure contract
is a time proﬁle of wages which describes how a worker’s wage will evolve with tenure. All
ﬁrms post contracts before workers apply and each applicant observes all oﬀers. Employed
workers continue to search on the job for better contracts elsewhere. I characterize the
market equilibrium and establish its existence. Then, I show that the equilibrium yields
novel predictions about individual workers’ job-to-job transition and aggregate outcomes.
To see why directed search is interesting to study, it is useful to contrast it with the
large literature on undirected search developed from Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982),
and Pissarides (1990). There are two classes of models in this literature. In one class, as in
the three pioneering works, prices (wages) are a result of bargaining after individuals are
matched. In the other class, some individuals post prices but the searching individuals do
not know who posted what prices (e.g., Burdett and Mortensen, 1998, and Burdett and
Coles, 2003). In both classes of models, search is undirected because prices play no role,
ex ante, to direct workers to particular matches.
Although undirected search captures important frictions, there are good reasons why
it does not describe a search market adequately. First, some search is directed rather than
completely random. For example, searching workers often have information about wages,
from job advertisement, word of mouth, or referrals. This is particularly true for workers
who search on the job. Second, it has been a long tradition in economics to treat prices as a
useful mechanism to direct the allocation of resources, ex ante. By abandoning this role of
prices, the literature of undirected search generates an array of ineﬃciencies in the market.
The corrective policy depends on arbitrary details of matching and price determination
processes (see Hosios, 1990). Directed search can eliminate most of these ineﬃciencies.
Third, undirected search generates wage dispersion that is sensitive to the assumption on
how many wages a worker knows before search. In these models, a searching worker knows
either no wage beforehand as in the three pioneering works, or one wage (the worker’s
current wage) as in the on-the-job search model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998). If each
searching worker knows two or more wages, instead, then wage dispersion disappears in
these models. This sensitivity reduces the potency of undirected search as an explanation
for wage dispersion. Directed search is immune to this sensitivity.
During the last ﬁfteen years or so, a literature has grown to analyze directed search. Pe-
1ters (1984, 1991) and Montgomery (1991) provide two of the earliest formulations. Exam-
ples of further explorations include Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a,b), Julien,
et al. (2000), Burdett, et al. (2001), Shi (2001), Galenianos and Kircher (2005), and
Delacroix and Shi (2006). They have shown that an equilibrium with directed search and
its eﬃciency properties are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those with undirected search.
This literature has not yet introduced wage-tenure contracts; instead, it has assumed
that each ﬁrm posts a single ﬁx e dw a g ef o rt h ee n t i r ed u r a t i o no ft h ew o r k e r ’ se m p l o y m e n t
with the ﬁrm. Moreover, only one model in this literature (i.e., Delacroix and Shi, 2006) has
incorporated on-the-job search. Without wage-tenure contracts, the literature of directed
search is unable to explain the empirical regularities that wages rise and quit rates fall with
tenure (e.g., Farber, 1999). Without on-the-job search, a model cannot make predictions
on job-to-job transitions which constitute a large part of the ﬂow of workers in the data.
There is an urgency to ﬁll in these gaps between directed search theory and the data, given
the appealing features of directed search discussed above.
The immediate challenge of this task is to formulate the equilibrium with contracts and
prove its existence. To appreciate the challenge, it is useful to compare the task with the
one in undirected search, which is accomplished by Burdett and Coles (2003, termed as BC
henceforth). With undirected search, one does not need to formulate workers’ application
decisions, because workers are assumed to send their applications randomly to a pool of
recruiting ﬁrms. With directed search, however, each worker’s application must be optimal.
In this decision, a worker makes the optimal tradeoﬀ b e t w e e na no ﬀer and the likelihood
of obtaining the oﬀer. Similarly, each ﬁrm understands that it can raise the oﬀer to entice
more workers to apply to the ﬁrm. To describe this tradeoﬀ, I need two new objects in
addition to the set of optimal contracts. One is the employment rate function, which
describes how the rate at which an applicant gets a particular oﬀer varies with the oﬀer.
T h eo t h e ri st h eh i r i n gr a t ef u n c t i o n ,w h i c hd escribes how the rate at which a recruiting
ﬁrm successfully hires a worker varies with the oﬀer. These functions are equilibrium
objects: They must be consistent with the aggregation of individuals’ optimal choices, and
the hiring rate must ensure that all equilibrium oﬀers earn the same expected proﬁtt oa
ﬁrm. A challenge is to show that these functions exist.
I formulate the equilibrium in an environment where all ﬁrm-worker pairs have the same
productivity, and then establish the existence of the equilibrium. The equilibrium extends
several realistic properties from the BC model of undirected search to directed search.
First, wages increase and quit rates fall with tenure, because ﬁnding a higher oﬀer becomes
increasingly diﬃcult as a worker’s wage rises. Second, all equilibrium contracts are sections
2of a baseline contract. The baseline contract starts with the lowest equilibrium wage and
then increases the wage with the worker’s tenure in the ﬁrm. Any other equilibrium contract
that starts at a diﬀerent wage is identical to the remaining section of the baseline contract
from that wage level onward. Third, wage-tenure contracts and on-the-job search generate
wage dispersion among workers, even though all matches have the same productivity and
all applicants observe all oﬀers before they apply.
Beyond these similarities, the equilibrium with directed search has little resemblance
to the one with undirected search. One main diﬀerence is the prediction about individuals’
job-to-job transitions. With directed search, t h ee m p l o y m e n tr a t ei sad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o n
of the oﬀer and the hiring rate is an increasing function of the oﬀer. Thus, the tradeoﬀ
between an oﬀer and the matching rate is non-trivial. Each worker chooses to apply to
au n i q u eo ﬀer and the applicants are separated endogenously. That is, a worker whose
current state yields a higher value chooses to apply to a higher oﬀer than another worker
w h o s ec u r r e n ts t a t eh a sal o w e rv a l u e .S u c hs e p a ration implies that wage mobility is limited
endogenously by the worker’s current wage. In contrast, undirected search models (e.g.,
BC, 2003, and Burdett and Mortensen, 1998) assume that any two workers have the same
probability of receiving an oﬀer that is higher than their current wages.
Another diﬀerence is the shape of the wage distribution of employed workers. There
is a non-degenerate, continuous distribution of wages both in the current model and in
the BC model. However, in the current model, the density function of the distribution of
e m p l o y e dw o r k e r so v e rw a g e si si n c r e a s i n ga tl ow wages and decreasing at high wages. This
non-monotonic shape of the density function is an empirical regularity (see Kiefer and Neu-
mann, 1993), but it is not the prediction of an undirected search model with homogeneous
matches. Instead, an increasing density function of employed wages is necessary to sup-
port an equilibrium with undirected search and homogeneous matches. To eliminate this
unrealistic prediction, the literature of undirected search has introduced suﬃcient hetero-
geneity across matches (e.g., van den Berg and Ridder, 1998). It is important to know that
directed search can generate the non-monotonic wage density without such heterogeneity.
The third diﬀerence is comparative statics. Ani n c r e a s ei nu n e m p l o y m e n tb e n e ﬁts in the
sense of the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance has no eﬀect on the set of equilibrium contracts
or individual workers’ job-to-job transition rates, although it aﬀects wage distributions of
workers. If search were undirected, however, such an increase in unemployment beneﬁts
would increase the slope of the wage-tenure proﬁle and increase the transition rate from
low wages to high wages, as well as aﬀecting wage distributions.
In general, the distributions of workers and oﬀers have a much lesser role in determining
3equilibrium contracts and job-to-job transitions in the current model than in undirected
search models. The reason is that, with directed search, the matching rate functions (rather
than the distributions) play the critical role in determining the equilibrium. These functions
form a ﬁxed-point problem with optimal contracts and optimal applications. Only after
solving this ﬁxed-point problem can one deduce the implications on the distributions. The
reverse is true with undirected search. There, in order to oﬀer contracts optimally, the
ﬁrms must know the distributions of workers and oﬀers ﬁrst.
The main extension of this paper to the literature of directed search is to incorporate
wage-tenure contracts and on-the-job search, as discussed earlier. Here, a contrast must
be made to Delacroix and Shi (2006), who exami n ed i r e c t e ds e a r c ho nt h ej o bb ya s s u m i n g
that ﬁrms can oﬀer only ﬁxed wages over tenure. That paper shows that the equilibrium is
a wage ladder. The discreteness of the set of equilibrium wages makes the characterization
of the equilibrium quite messy in that model. Allowing for wage-tenure contracts not only
captures empirical regularities, but also simpliﬁes the characterization of the equilibrium —
Any initial gap between two oﬀers will eventually be ﬁlled in by the increasing wage proﬁle.
T h ea n a l y s i sh e r ei sm u c hm o r eg e n e r a lt h a nin Delacroix and Shi and, at the same time,
preserves the feature of limited wage mobility.
The continuous distribution of wages in the current model with homogeneous matches
is another contribution to the literature of undirected search. In a similar setting, the liter-
ature of directed search generates only a ﬁnite number, or even a singleton, of equilibrium
wages. In the current model, wage-tenure contracts provide a source of wage dispersion
because they allow workers who got jobs earlier to earn more than workers who got jobs
later, even if the two are employed under the same contract. The endogenous separation of
applicants is another source of wage dispersion because workers who got jobs earlier apply
to higher wages than other workers choose to.
To emphasize the diﬀerences between directed search and undirected search, I maintain
four assumptions imposed by BC. First, workers are risk averse; second, the capital market
is not perfect for workers to borrow against their future income. These assumptions are
important for generating the wage-tenure relationship, as discussed by BC. Third, a ﬁrm
does not respond to the worker’s outside oﬀers. One justiﬁcation for this assumption might
be that, since a worker can observe all ﬁrms’ posted oﬀers, he may be able to counterfeit
other ﬁrms’ oﬀers. If it is diﬃcult for a ﬁrm to verify such counterfeits, then it is optimal for
the ﬁrm not to respond to outside oﬀers. How reasonable this assumption is clearly varies
across diﬀerent types of labor markets. In checking the validity of the assumption, however,
one must keep in mind that all workers are assumed to have the same productivity in the
4current model. In any case, the assumption is commonly imposed in the literature, and
it enables me to compare the results clearly with those in BC. For a model of undirected
search without this assumption, see Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). Finally, I assume that
the productivity of a ﬁrm-worker pair is public information and deterministic. For private
information or learning about productivity, see Jovanovic (1979), Harris and Holmstrom
(1982), and Moscarini (2005). These productivity diﬀerences between matches or over time
are clearly important for wage dynamics and turnover, but abstracting from them enables
me to have the clearest exploration of the role of search frictions.
2. The Model
Consider a labor market that lasts forever in continuous time. There is a unit measure
of risk averse workers whose utility function is u(w), where w is income. Workers do not
have access to the ﬁnancial market to borrow against their future wage income, and so the
lower bound on wages is 0. All workers have the same productivity: when employed, each
worker produces a ﬂow of output, y>0. When unemployed, a worker enjoys a ﬂow of
utility u(b), which is derived from leisure and other beneﬁts in unemployment. I will refer
to b simply as the unemployment beneﬁt.
It will become clear later that the analysis is simpler if b is distributed in an interval,
rather than being concentrated on a discrete set. Accordingly, I assume that a worker who
enters unemployment draws a value of b from the interval [b,¯ b] according to a continuous
distribution H,w h e r e0<b< ¯ b. Let the density function h(b)=H0(b)b ed i ﬀerentiable.
To simplify the analysis further, I set ¯ b =¯ w,w h e r e¯ w is the highest wage speciﬁed later.
O n c eaw o r k e rd r a w sav a l u eo fb, the value will stay with him until he dies.
All workers face the process of death at a Poisson rate σ ∈ (0,∞). Dead workers are
replaced with newborns who enter the labor market through unemployment and who draw
unemployment beneﬁts according to the distribution H. To simplify the algebra, assume
that the rate of time preference is zero. However, the probability of death generates eﬀective
discounting on the future.
Assumption 1. The utility function has the following properties: 0 <u 0(w) < ∞ and
−∞ <u 00(w) < 0 for all w ∈ (0,∞); u0(0) = ∞;a n du(0) = −∞.
These properties are standard, except u(0) = −∞. This additional property is required
to ensure that wages are positive at all time in an optimal contract. As discussed extensively
by BC, if u(0) < ∞, then the optimal contract may be a wage path which starts with zero
5wage for a ﬁnite duration and then increases continuously into positive wages. If, in
addition, the workers are risk neutral, then the optimal wage path is a step function; i.e.,
the wage is zero initially, followed by a jump to a permanent level (see Stevens, 2004).
There are also a large number of identical ﬁrms that can enter the market. Entry is
competitive: a ﬁrm can recruit by incurring a ﬂow of vacancy cost k>0. Each vacancy
(ﬁrm) can recruit only one worker. Normalize the production cost to 0. Recruiting ﬁrms
announce wage-tenure contracts to compete for workers. A contract oﬀered at time s is
at i m ep a t ho fw a g e s ,W(s)={w(t)}∞
t=s, conditional on the continuation of the worker’s
employment with the ﬁrm. Although a worker can quit the ﬁrm at any time, the ﬁrm
is assumed to commit to the contract. Thus, employment is permanent until the worker
either quits the ﬁrm or dies.
Let V (t,s) be the remaining value of the contract to the worker whose tenure in the
ﬁrm is (t − s). This value is the expected utility to the worker in the lifetime generated
by the remaining wage path in the contract from t onward, given the worker’s optimal
quitting strategy in the future. I will refer to an oﬀer by its value to the worker at the
time of the oﬀer, V (s,s), because this is all that matters to an applicant. All oﬀers are
bounded in
h
V , ¯ V
i
,w h e r e
¯ V = u(¯ w)/σ,V = u(b)/σ
¯ w is the highest wage which will be given by Lemma 3.3. The upper bound ¯ V is the
lifetime utility of a worker who is employed at the highest wage permanently until death.
The lower bound V is the lifetime utility of a worker who has the lowest unemployment
beneﬁt forever until death. However, because an unemployed worker has the opportunity
of ﬁnding employment, all equilibrium oﬀers are likely to be strictly higher than V .Is a y
t h a tar e s u l th o l d sf o ra l lV if it holds for all V ∈ [V , ¯ V ].
B o t hu n e m p l o y e da n de m p l o y e dw o r k e r sc a ns e a r c hf o rj o b s . A ta n yi n s t a n t ,a nu n -
employed worker receives an opportunity to apply to a job with probability λ0,a n da n
employed worker receives the opportunity with probability λ1.1 I allow for the possibility
λ0 = λ1 = 1 by letting λ0, λ1 ∈ (0,1]. A worker who receives the application opportunity
observes all ﬁrms’ oﬀers instantly without any cost and then chooses the oﬀer to which he
applies. As in most search models, each worker can apply to only one oﬀer.2
1Note that the λ’es are not Poisson rates, but rather the probabilities of receiving a job application
opportunity at any instant. As such, they are bounded above by one.
2Let me clarify two assumptions here. One is that an applicant observes all oﬀers. This assumption is
not necessary, because the essential results in directed search are the same if each applicant is assumed to
observe two oﬀers that are randomly drawn from the oﬀer distribution (see Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999b).
The second assumption is that each applicant can apply to only one oﬀer at a time. (For a directed search
6There is no coordination among ﬁrms’ recruiting decisions or workers’ applications.
When there are two or more ﬁrms making an oﬀer to which a worker wants to apply,
the worker randomly selects one to apply. Similarly, a ﬁrm may receive more than one
applicant, in which case the ﬁrm randomly selects one to employ. If the selected worker
is employed elsewhere, the worker must quit that job before accepting the oﬀer. I assume
that ﬁrms do not match the worker’s outside oﬀers, as discussed in the introduction. A
j o bi sd e s t r o y e dw h e ne i t h e rt he worker accepts another ﬁrm’s oﬀer or the worker dies.
Because workers observe the oﬀe r sb e f o r et h e ya p p l yt ot h ej o b s ,t h eo ﬀers can direct
the search. That is, both workers and ﬁrms make an explicit tradeoﬀ b e t w e e na no ﬀer and
t h em a t c h i n gr a t ea tt h a to ﬀer. When oﬀe r i n gav a l u eV ,aﬁrm will succeed in hiring a
worker at a rate q(V ) according to the Poisson process. By changing the oﬀer, the ﬁrm
knows that its hiring rate will change according to q(.). Similarly, when applying to V ,
a worker will obtain the job at a rate p(V ). By applying to a diﬀerent oﬀer, a worker
understands that his employment rate will change according to p(.). Note that p and q are
Poisson rates instead of probabilities, and so they can exceed one.
More importantly, the functions q(.)a n dp(.) are equilibrium objects, since they must
satisfy two equilibrium requirements. First, they must be consistent with aggregation.
That is, as ﬁrms and workers make their choices under these functions, the resulting match-
ing rates must indeed be given by these functions. Second, the hiring rate function must
ensure that the expected proﬁt of recruiting be the same for all equilibrium oﬀers. Delaying
the second requirement to section 4, I formulate the ﬁrst requirement below.
Aggregate consistency imposes a link between the two functions, q(.)a n dp(.). To
see this, let M(x,1) be a linearly homogenous matching function that determines the
measure of matches between a measure x of workers and a unit measure of ﬁrms. Given
the two functions of the matching rates, individuals’ decisions result in a tightness θ(V )
for each oﬀer V , which is the ratio of applicants for V to recruiting ﬁrms at V . Then,
q(V )=M(θ(V ),1) and p(V )=M(θ(V ),1)/θ(V ). Using these relationships to eliminate
θ,Ic a ne x p r e s sp(V )=P(q(V )). This relationship between the two matching rates is
what aggregate consistency requires.
The function P(q) embodies all essential properties of the matching function. From now
on, I will take P(q) as a primitive of the model and refer to it as the matching function.3 To
model with multiple applications, see Galenianos and Kircher, 2005). In continuous time, this assumption
is not as restrictive as it may sound. Although a worker in reality may be able to send out multiple
applications, the probability with which two or more of his applications will be received by diﬀerent ﬁrms
a tt h es a m ei n s t a n tc a nb ev e r ys m a l l .
3Some directed search models have gone one step further to derive the matching function endogenously
7specify the properties of the matching function, let q(V ) ∈ [q, ¯ q] for all V ,w i t h0<q< ¯ q,
where ¯ q is given by the matching function and q will be deﬁned later by (5.4).
Assumption 2. The matching function P(q) has the following features: (i) P(q) is con-
tinuous for all q ∈ [q, ¯ q] and, for all q in the interior of (q, ¯ q), the derivatives P0(q) and P00(q)
exist and are ﬁnite; (ii) ¯ q<∞ and P(¯ q)=0 ; (iii) P0(q) < 0;( i v )−qP00(q)/P 0(q) ≤ 2.
Part (i) is a regularity condition that is satisﬁed by many well-known matching func-
tions. Part (ii) is imposed for the convenience of working with bounded functions. Part
(iii) is equivalent to 0 < θM1/M < 1, which is satisﬁed by all matching functions of con-
stant returns to scale that are strictly increasing in the arguments. In the equilibrium, I
will show q0(V ) > 0. Then, part (iii) ensures p0(V ) < 0. Part (iv) restricts the convexity
of P(q), which will be useful for ensuring uniqueness of a worker’s application decision.4
To see the diﬀerent parts of the assumption more clearly, consider the matching function
with a constant elasticity of substitution between searching workers and vacancies:
Example 2.1. If M(θ,1) = [αθρ +1− α]






Parts (i) and (iii) of Assumption 2 are satisﬁed. Part (ii) is satisﬁed iﬀ −∞ < ρ < 0, i.e.,
iﬀ the elasticity of substitution between searching workers and vacancies is less than one.
In this case, ¯ q =( 1−α)1/ρ.P a r t( i v )i ss a t i s ﬁed iﬀ α ≥ 1−(1−ρ)qρ/2.W h e nρ ≤− 1,t h i s
condition is satisﬁed for all α > 0.W h e n−1 < ρ < 0, the condition puts a lower bound
on α.N o t et h a t ,f o rρ < 0, the derivatives P0(q) and P00(q) are unbounded at q =¯ q.
3. Workers’ and Firms’ Optimal Decisions
In this section, I will characterize agents’ optimal decisions and their value functions.
Throughout this paper, denote ˙ x = dx/dt for any variable x.
by aggregating agents’ strategies, e.g., Peters (1991), Burdett et al. (2001), Julien et al. (2000) and
Delacrox and Shi (2006). In this paper, I follow the approach in Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999a) to take the matching function as given. This allows me to focus on the main feature of directed
search, i.e., that agents take into account how their choices of oﬀers and applications will aﬀect their
matching rates.
4For a general matching function, part (iv) of the assumption requires 1−θM1/M ≤ [−θM11/(2M1)]1/2,
where the left-hand side of the inequality is the share of vacancies in the matching function.
83.1. Optimal Application
Workers’ search is directed by the employment rate, p(V ), which gives the Poisson rate
of getting an oﬀer V . As emphasized before, this function is an equilibrium object. Be-
fore analyzing workers’ search decisions, I describe the properties of this function by the
following lemma, which is an implication of Lemma 5.1 later.
Lemma 3.1. Under Assumption 2, p(V ) is bounded, continuous and concave for all V .
Moreover, p(V ) is diﬀerentiable and strictly decreasing for all V<¯ V ,w i t hp(¯ V )=0 .
Examine an applicant, who can be either employed or unemployed. Let V (t)b et h e
value that the worker can obtain at his current state. This notation suppresses the starting
time of the contract, if the worker is employed. After receiving a job application opportu-
nity, the expected increase in value to the worker is:
E(V (t)) = max
f∈[V (t),¯ V ]
p(f)[f − V (t)]. (3.1)
Denote the solution as f(t)=F(V (t)). Then F is given implicitly as follows:




The following lemma is proven in Appendix A:
Lemma 3.2. F(¯ V )=¯ V . For all V<¯ V , the following results hold: (i) There is a
unique and interior solution to (3.1), f = F(V ); (ii) F(.) is continuous and E(V ) is
diﬀerentiable, with E0(V )=−p(F(V )) < 0; (iii) F(.) is strictly increasing; (iv) if p(.) is
twice continuously diﬀerentiable, then F(V ) is diﬀerentiable with 0 <F 0(V ) ≤ 1/2,a n d
E(V ) is twice diﬀerentiable.
For a worker at a value V , applying to the oﬀer F(V ) is the only optimal choice. This
is true despite the fact that the worker observes all other oﬀers. Oﬀers higher than F(V )
are not suﬃcient for compensating for the lower probability of getting them. Oﬀers lower
than F(V ) have higher probabilities of being obtained, but these probabilities are not high
enough for compensating for the low values. For workers at a value V , only the oﬀer F(V )
provides the optimal tradeoﬀ between the value and the probability of obtaining it.
Not only is a worker’s optimal application unique, it is also monotonic in the worker’s
current value. That is, a worker with a higher current value applies for higher oﬀers than
a worker with a lower value. Thus, the workers choose to separate themselves in the
9application process according to their current values. This separation is optimal because
an applicant’s payoﬀ function has the single-crossing property. That is, compared with an
applicant with a low current value, an applicant with a high value can tolerate a higher
risk of not getting an oﬀer in exchange for a higher value of the oﬀer. When an applicant
with a high current value fails to get the oﬀer to which he applies, his current job provides
a good backup or insurance. As a result, he can aﬀo r dt o“ g a m b l e ”o na p p l y i n gt oh i g h e r
oﬀers than does a worker with a low current value. Therefore, the optimal application
choice, F(V ), is an increasing function.
Figure 1 illustrates the single-crossing property between worker 1 at a value V1 and
worker 2 at value V2,w h e r eV2 >V 1.W o r k e r i’s indiﬀerence curve can be written as
f = Vi + Ei/p,f o ri =1 ,2. Suppose that the two workers’ indiﬀerence curves cross each
other at a particular point (f0,p 0), where f0 >V 2. At this crossing point, the slope of
worker i’s indiﬀerence curve is df /dp < 0, and the absolute value of this slope decreases
with Vi. This implies that, for the same increase in the oﬀer, the high-value worker (worker
2) is willing to take a larger reduction in the probability of getting the oﬀer than does worker
1. Equivalently, for the same reduction in the probability of getting an oﬀer, worker 2 is
willing to apply to a higher oﬀer than worker 1.
   f    indifference curve for V1
0 > df/dp = - (f0 - Vi)/p0
 f '
indifference curve
  f0       for V2 > V1
  p2   p1       p0     p
Figure 1. Monotonicity of the application decision
The optimality of the application decision is one of the key diﬀerences between this
model and the BC model, or more generally, between directed search and undirected search.
Models with undirected search have no counterpart to the above decision problem by an
applicant; instead, an applicant is assumed to randomly apply to a value which is drawn
from the oﬀer distribution. Such an application is not optimal. First of all, the application
10m a yr e s u l ti na no ﬀer which the worker will not accept. Second, even if the application
results in an acceptable oﬀer, there is a continuum of values from which the oﬀer comes
from. In contrast, with directed search, the set of values to which a worker optimally
chooses to apply is a singleton.
This contrast between the two models leads to sharply diﬀerent predictions on job-to-
job transitions and wage mobility. Directed search predicts a deﬁnite pattern of transition
and endogenously limited mobility in wages between jobs. For example, take two workers
whose current wages are w1 and w2, respectively, with w2 >w 1.L e t wA be the starting
wage of the contract to which worker 1 will apply, and wB be the starting wage of the
contract to which worker 2 will apply. Then, for these two workers, the probability of
transiting immediately to another job with a starting wage above wB is zero. Moreover,
for any w0 ∈ (wA,w B), the likelihood ratio between worker 2’s and worker 1’s probability
of immediately transiting to another job with a starting wage above w0 is inﬁnite. In
undirected search models, the probability of transiting to wages above wB is positive for
both workers, and the likelihood ratio is constant and ﬁnite.
In addition to limited wage mobility, directed search also yields predictions on the gain
to a worker from an application.5 First, a worker who has a high current value gains less
from an application than a worker who has a low current value. This is true in terms of
the expected gain from an application, because E0(V ) < 0. The result is also true in terms
of the actual gain in percentage, (F − V )/V , because F0(V ) ≤ 1/2 <F (V )/V .W i t h
risk aversion, however, this decreasing gain in the value does not necessarily translate into
a decreasing gain in wages. The decreasing gain in the value partly reﬂects the worker’s
decreasing marginal utility as the wage increases. Second, E00(V ) > 0. That is, the decrease
in the expected gain from an application slows down as the worker’s current value increases.
3.2. Value Functions of Workers and Firms
For an employed worker, the value can change over time for four possible reasons. The ﬁrst
is the change in wages during the contract with the same ﬁrm. The second is the event
that the worker obtains a better oﬀer and quits the current job.6 The third is death. The
fourth is the adjustment to the steady state. As in the literature, I abstract from the last
5Delacroix and Shi (2006) establish similar features in a model with directed, on-the-job search, but
they restrict that oﬀers must be a constant wage over time. Nevertheless, the similarity suggests that these
f e a t u r e sa r ec o m m o ni nd i r e c t e ds e a r c hm o d e l s .
6The worker can also choose to quit the job to become unemployed if the wage proﬁle is suﬃciently
decreasing. However, this event will never occur in the equilibrium, because the optimal wage proﬁle has
increasing wages with tenure, as shown later.
11source of changes in the value by focusing on a stationary equilibrium. Because the rate
of time preference is zero, the value for an employed worker evolves as follows:
˙ V (t)=σV (t) − u(w(t)) − λ1E(V (t)) (3.3)
If wages were constant over tenure, then ˙ V =0 .
In contrast to wages, the unemployment beneﬁt does not change over time once it is
drawn. Thus, the value to an unemployed worker with a given beneﬁt, b,w i l lb ec o n s t a n t
over time as long as he stays unemployed. Denote this value as Vu(b). Then,
0=σVu(b) − u(b) − λ0E(Vu(b)). (3.4)
To characterize a ﬁrm’s value function, consider a ﬁrm that has an employed worker at
time t under a contract whose remaining value to the worker is V (t). (Again, I suppress the
starting time of the contract in this notation.) Let J(t)d e n o t et h i sﬁrm’s value. Because
the worker quits at rate λ1p(F(V (t))) and dies at rate σ,t h e n
˙ J(t)=[ σ + λ1p(F(V (t)))]J(t) − y + w(t). (3.5)
For dynamic optimization, it is useful to express the ﬁrm’s values as the discounted
sum of proﬁt s .T od os o ,l e tt0 be an arbitrary point in [s,t], where s ≤ t is the starting
time of the contract. Let γ(t,t0) be the probability that a worker will still be with the ﬁrm






Equivalently, γ is given by the solution to the following diﬀerential equation:
dγ(t,t0)
dt
= −[σ + λ1p(F(V (t)))]γ(t,t0), (3.7)
where γ(t0,t 0)=1a n dγ(∞,t 0) = 0. Because J is bounded, it satisﬁes the transversality





For any t0 ≥ s, this value is determined by the remaining contract from t0 onward.
123.3. Optimal Recruiting Decisions and Contracts
Take an arbitrary time s ≥ 0. A ﬁrm’s recruiting decision at time s contains two parts.
The ﬁrst part is to choose a value V (s) at which to recruit. The optimal choice maximizes
the ﬁrm’s expected value, q(V (s))J(s), taking the function q(V ) as given. As I will explain
later, the solution to this part of the ﬁrm’s problem is a continuum of positive values of
V (s). The second part of a ﬁrm’s problem is to choose a wage proﬁle (i.e., a contract) to
maximize J(s) and to deliver the value V (s). I characterize this decision below.
The optimal contract, {w(t)}∞
t=s,s o l v e s :
(P)m a xJ(s)s . t .( 3 . 3 )f o ra l lt ≥ s.
In this problem, V (s) is taken as given, and so the maximized value of J(s)i saf u n c t i o n
of V (s). I express this fact by writing J(s)a sJ(V (s)).
Treat γ(t,s) as an auxiliary state variable in the dynamic optimization and (3.7) as the
law of motion of γ. Then, the Hamiltonian of the dynamic optimization is:
H(t,s)=( y − w)γ(t,s) − Λγ [σ + λ1p(F(V ))]γ(t,s)+ΛV [σV − u(w) − λ1E(V )],
where Λγ and ΛV are shadow prices of γ and V . I suppressed time on the right-hand
side, except for γ. Following a similar argument to that in BC, it can be shown that
the assumption u(0) = −∞ implies w(t) > 0 for almost all t in all optimal contracts.










Optimal contracts have three important properties. First, an optimal contract provides
optimal sharing of the value between a ﬁrm and its worker. To express this feature formally,
note that the Hamiltonian is zero at the optimum.7 Thus, an optimal contract satisﬁes:




To explain, suppose that the contract increases the value to the worker by a marginal
amount, ˙ V . This will entail an increase in the wage by an amount, ˙ V/ u 0(w). The cost to
the ﬁrm, in terms of proﬁt, is − ˙ J. The above condition requires that the marginal cost to
the ﬁrm from increasing the wage should be equal to the marginal beneﬁtt ot h ew o r k e r .
7To obtain this result, diﬀerentiate the Hamiltonian with respect to time, and then substitute (3.3),
(3.5) and the optimality conditions. This shows that the Hamiltonian, H(t,s), is constant over t. Because
γ(∞,s)=0 ,t h e nH(t,s)=H(∞,s) = 0 for all t ≥ s.
13For the analysis later, it is useful to substitute (3.5) and (3.3) to rewrite (3.9) as:
u
0(w)(y − w)+u(w)=u
0(w)[σ + λ1p(F(V ))]J(V )+[ σV − λ1E(V )] (3.10)
The best way to explain this condition is to view a worker-ﬁrm pair as a joint asset. With
this view, the left-hand side of the above equation measures the ﬂow of “dividends” to the
asset, which consists of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, evaluated with the worker’s marginal utility, and
the worker’s utility of the wage. The right-hand side is the “permanent income” generated
by the asset. In particular, the permanent income to the ﬁrm is [σ + λ1p(F)]J,w h i c hi s
translated into units of utility with the marginal utility of the worker. The permanent
income to the worker is [σV − λ1E(V )]. The optimal contract requires that the ﬂow of
dividends to the joint asset should be equal to the permanent income of the asset.
Second, an optimal contract provides an increasing wage proﬁle that increases with
tenure. This feature and the bounds on wages are stated in the following lemma (see
Appendix B for a proof):
Lemma 3.3. ˙ w(t) > 0 for all V<¯ V .M o r e o v e r ,¯ w = y − σk/¯ q<y , ¯ V = u(¯ w)/σ,
J(¯ V )=k/¯ q>0,a n dq(¯ V )=¯ q<∞.
There are two forces that make an optimal wage proﬁle smoothly increase with tenure.
The ﬁrst is a ﬁrm’s incentive to retain a worker and the second is a worker’s risk aversion.
To retain a worker, it is optimal for a ﬁrm to backload wages so as to increase the worker’s
opportunity cost of quitting. As the wage and the value of the job to the worker rise with
tenure, the probability with which the employee can ﬁnd a better oﬀer elsewhere falls, and
so the worker’s quit rate falls with tenure. Thus, a rising wage proﬁle is less costly to the
ﬁrm than a constant wage proﬁle that provides the same expected value to the worker.
However, if workers are risk neutral, then the best way for a ﬁrm to backload wages is
to oﬀer a step function as the wage contract (see Stevens, 2004). With risk aversion,
workers prefer a smooth wage proﬁle to a discontinuous proﬁl e ,a n ds ow a g e si na no p t i m a l
contract are smoothly increasing with tenure. These two forces appear in the equation
for wage dynamics, (3.8): the incentive to retain a worker appears through the negative
derivative dp(F(V ))/dV (< 0) and a worker’s risk aversion through u00 < 0.
Because the wage is increasing with tenure and because the wage is bounded above, all
optimal wage proﬁles increase toward the upper bound ¯ w as t →∞ . Accordingly, the value
f o ra ne m p l o y e dw o r k e rc o n v e r g e st o¯ V .8 This convergence in the value is also monotonic,
as I will show later in Corollary 5.3. As a result, a ﬁrm’s value falls over time.
8Oﬀers above ¯ V are not optimal because they generate expected values to the ﬁrm that are less than
the recruiting cost.
14The third property of optimal contracts is that all optimal contracts are sections of
a baseline contracts. To describe this property, let the baseline optimal contract be
{wb(t)}∞
t=0,w h e r ewb(0) is the lowest wage equilibrium wage. Every other optimal con-
tract, {w(t)}∞
t=0, traces out the baseline contract from a particular initial wage level. That
is, the entire set of optimal contracts is:
{{w(t)}
∞
t=0 : s ∈ [0,∞); w(t)=wb(t + s)f o ra l lt}.
This property is an implication of the principle of dynamic optimality. To explain why,
note that the above problem of optimal contracts does not depend on the starting time s
separately once V is given. Suppose that there are two contracts: contract 1 is oﬀered at
time s1 and contract 2 oﬀered at s2 >s 1.T h ev a l u eo ﬀered by contract 2 is V2.S u p p o s e
that contract 1 from s2 onward also delivers V2, then this remaining part of contract 1 must
be the same as contract 2. Otherwise, the ﬁrm that oﬀers contract 1 could replace the
remaining part by contract 2 and, by the optimality of contract 2 at s2, the replacement
would improve the ﬁrm’s expected value.
This property of dynamic optimality simpliﬁes the analysis greatly. One simpliﬁcation
is that characterizing the entire set of optimal contracts at any time is equivalent to tracing
out the baseline contract over time. Similarly, characterizing the set of oﬀer values at any
time is equivalent to tracing out the values provided by the baseline contract over time.
From now on, I will focus on the baseline contract, suppress the subscript b, and suppress
the starting point of a contract.
Another simpliﬁcation is that the wage at any tenure can be written as a function of
the value remaining in the contract, rather than a function of time. To do so, let V be the
set of equilibrium lifetime utilities. Deﬁne v1 =i n f( V) and deﬁne T by
T(V (t)) = t,w i t hT(v1)=0 . (3.11)
Then, T(x) is the length of tenure required for a worker to increase the value from v1 to x
according to the baseline wage contract. The wage level of a worker with tenure t on the
baseline contract is w(T(V (t))). With a slight abuse of the notation, I express this wage
as w(V ) and refer to the function as the wage function. The above explanation makes it
clear that w(V (t)) is also the starting wage of a contract that is oﬀered at t with a value
V (t) to the worker. The notation w(V ) should be construed to mean that wage can only
vary over time when the value to the worker changes over time.
Similarly, the notation J(V ) indicates that a ﬁrm’s value can only change over time






4. Deﬁnition and Conﬁguration of the Equilibrium
Let n be the fraction of workers who are employed and (1−n) the fraction of workers who
are unemployed. Let Ge be the cumulative distribution function of employed workers over
values and Gu be the distribution of unemployed workers over values.
An equilibrium is a set of lifetime utilities, V, a Poisson rate of employment, p(.), an
application strategy, F(.), a value function J(.), a wage function w(.), and distributions of
workers, (Ge,G u,n), that satisfy the following requirements:
(i) F(V ) solves (3.1), given p(.);
(ii) Given F(.)a n dp(.), each value V ∈ V is delivered by a contract that solves
(P)f o rs = 0 with a starting wage w(V ), and the resulting value function of
the ﬁrm is J(V );
(iii) Zero expected proﬁt of recruiting: q(V )J(V )=k for all V ∈ [V , ¯ V ], and
q(V )J(V ) <kfor all V>¯ V ,w h e r eq(V )=P−1(p(V ));
(iv) Ge,G u and n are stationary.
Most elements of this deﬁnition are self-explanatory, but requirement (iii) needs a clar-
iﬁcation. This requirement asks the function q(V )t oi n d u c ez e r oe x p e c t e dp r o ﬁtf r o m
recruiting for all V ∈ [V , ¯ V ] ,n o tj u s tf o rV ∈ V.S i n c e V is a strict subset of [V , ¯ V ], as
I will show later, the requirement imposes a restriction on beliefs out of the equilibrium.
The reason for imposing this restriction is as follows. For a non-equilibrium value V/ ∈ V,
there can be two diﬀerent reasons why the value is not in the equilibrium set. One is the
self-fulﬁlling expectation that no worker will apply to that value: This expectation induces
ﬁrms not to oﬀer that value, in which case no worker will apply to that value, indeed. The
second reason is that, even after ﬁrms oﬀer that value, workers still ﬁnd it optimal not
to apply to it. The ﬁrst reason for a “missing market” may not be robust to a trembling
event that exogenously puts some recruiting ﬁrms at the value V . Requirement (iii) ex-
cludes such non-robust equilibria, and hence, reﬁnes the set of equilibria. This reﬁnement
resembles trembling-hand perfection.
Requirement (iii) can be viewed as a condition that determines the equilibrium func-
tion of ﬁrms’ hiring rate, and hence, of applicants’ employment rate. For given J(.), the
16requirement yields q(V )=k/J(V ), and so p(V )=P(k/J(V )) for all V ∈ [V , ¯ V ].9 For
all V>¯ V , requirement (iii) states that recruiting at such values makes an expected loss
to the ﬁr m .T h i sp a r to ft h er e q u i r e m e n ti sa l w a y ss a t i s ﬁed, because Lemma 3.3 implies
q(V )J(V ) ≤ ¯ qJ(V ) < ¯ qJ(¯ V )=k.
I illustrate the likely conﬁguration of the equilibrium in Figure 2. The set of equilibrium
values for employed workers is V =[ v1, ¯ V ] and the set of equilibrium values for unemployed
workers is [v0, ¯ V ], where v1 >v 0 >V. There are workers employed, and ﬁrms recruiting,
at every level in [v1, ¯ V ]. Similarly, there are unemployed workers at every level in [v0, ¯ V ].
However, the arrows in Figure 2 depict only the applications of the workers at the special
values vj deﬁned later, where j =0 ,1,2,.... For a worker whose value is vj,h i so p t i m a l
choice of application is vj+1 = F(vj). Similarly, for a worker whose value lies in the
interior of a segment, say V ∈ (vj,v j+1), he optimally applies to a unique value F(V )
in the interior of the next segment, (vj+1,v j+2). As remarked earlier, such optimality of
workers’ applications is the key diﬀerence between this model and an undirected search
model, such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and BC. If search is undirected, a worker
sends the application to a randomly selected value in [v1, ¯ V ].
 employed
 workers:
 v1         v2  v3 ……    V
 unemployed
 workers:
      v0  v1         v2  v3 ……    V
Figure 2. An illustration of the equilibrium
This diﬀerence in the nature of search implies a diﬀerent procedure of ﬁnding an equi-
librium. In an undirected search model, the most important equilibrium objects are the
9An alternative method of obtaining the function p(.) is to require that a worker’s expected surplus
from applying to every oﬀer (including a non-equilibrium oﬀer) be the same. This method has been used
in models of directed search with homogeneous applicants. However, the method is not practical when
the applicants are heterogeneous. In this case, it is not possible to have one function p(.) that induces all
applicants to be indiﬀerent between a non-equilibrium oﬀe ra n da ne q u i l i b r i u mo ﬀer.
17distributions of values and workers. These distributions determine a worker’s employment
rate and a ﬁrm’s hiring rate. To solve for an equilibrium under undirected search, one
must solve for these distributions ﬁrst. The procedure is almost reversed when search is
directed. Now the most important equilibrium object is the function of the employment
rate, p(V ). This function is critical for determining workers’ optimal applications. It is
also critical for determining ﬁrms’ optimal recruiting decisions, because it implies the hir-
ing rate, q(V ). One can determine the function, p(V ), by invoking requirements (i) — (iii)
in the equilibrium deﬁnition, without any explicit reference to the distribution of oﬀers or
workers. Once this is done, the distributions of oﬀers and workers can be calculated by
invoking requirement (iv) in the equilibrium deﬁnition.
Before carrying out the analysis on the equilibrium in the next two sections, let me
explain how heterogeneity in unemployment beneﬁts simpliﬁes the analysis. Let us see
what will happen if all unemployed workers have the same unemployment beneﬁt, say b.I n
this case, all unemployed workers will have the same value, v0. They will choose to apply to
the same value v1.T h ew o r k e r se m p l o y e da tv1 will apply to v2, and so on. Because there
is a positive mass of unemployed workers, there will be a positive mass of workers at each
of the values vj, j =1 ,2,.... Some of these workers will fail to get a better job in the next
while and, according to the optimal contract, their values will drift up. Thus, there will
be mass points at values vj + x<v j+1,f o rs o m ex>0a n da l lj ≥ 1. With all these mass
points, it is diﬃcult to characterize the stationary distribution of workers. This diﬃculty
is eliminated by introducing a continuous distribution of unemployment beneﬁts. With
this distribution, the value for unemployed workers will be dispersed over a continuum.
As a result, their application targets will be dispersed over a continuum of values. This
eliminates the mass points described above.10
5. Equilibrium Employment Rate and the Wage Function
The main step of determining an equilibrium is to determine the function of the employment
rate, p(V ). For the analysis, however, it is more convenient to build the existence around
t h ew a g ef u n c t i o n ,w(V ). The following procedure develops a mapping for w and obtains
other functions such as J(V ), p(V )a n dF(V ).
Start with any function w(.) and add the subscript w to other functions constructed
10Undirected search models avoid this technical problem by assuming that workers randomly apply to
all jobs. In such models, an unemployed worker accepts all oﬀers in the equilibrium. Thus, the assumption
makes workers dispersed over a continuum of values.
18with this given function. First, given w(.), I integrate (3.12) and use J(¯ V )=k/¯ q to get:













Third, with pw(V ) as the employment rate, I can express a worker’s optimal application as
f = Fw(V ) and the expected gain from the application as Ew(V ). Fourth, I explore (3.10),
which is a requirement on a ﬁrm’s optimal recruiting decision. Treat w on the left-hand
side of (3.10) as a variable but substitute the given function w(V )f o rw on the right-hand
side. To avoid confusion, use w1 instead of w on the left-hand side. Then,
u(w1)+u
0(w1)(y − w1)=u
0(w(V ))[σ + λ1pw(Fw(V ))]Jw(V )+σV − λ1Ew(V ) (5.3)
Denote the solution for w1 as w1(V ). Then, w1(V )=( Γw)(V ). The equilibrium wage
function w(V )i saﬁxed point of the mapping Γ, i.e., w(V )=( Γw)(V )f o ra l lV .
Conﬁrming an earlier statement, the above procedure does not involve the distributions
of workers and oﬀers. An implication is that optimal contracts and applications are inde-
pendent of such distributions. I will explore this feature of the equilibrium later in section
7.
To characterize the ﬁxed point for w, let me specify a few bounds on various functions.
First, using the constant ¯ w to replace the function w(V ) in (5.1) and (5.2), I obtain
J ¯ w(V )a n dp ¯ w(V ). Because Jw(.)a n dpw(.) are monotone in w,t h e nJw(V ) ≤ J ¯ w(V )a n d
pw(V ) ≤ p ¯ w(V )f o ra l lV .S e c o n d ,d e ﬁne
q = k/J¯ w(V ). (5.4)
Since J ¯ w(V ) is decreasing, q(V ) ∈ [q, ¯ q] for all V ,a n dq ∈ (0, ¯ q). This lower bound on q is
the one used in Assumption 2. Similarly, p(V ) is bounded in [0,P(q)]. Third, let w be a
strictly positive number that is suﬃciently close to 0.
Assumption 3. Assume that b, V and w satisfy:
(0 <) b < ¯ w = y − σk/¯ q (5.5)
J ¯ w(V )[σ + λ1p ¯ w(V )] <y (5.6)
u(w)+u
0(w)[y − w − J ¯ w(V )(σ + λ1p ¯ w(V ))] ≥ u(b). (5.7)
19The condition (5.5) is a regularity condition: When it is violated, all workers will choose
to stay out of employment. The condition (5.6) requires that the permanent income of a
job to a ﬁrm is less than output even when the ﬁrm is providing the lowest value to the
worker. To see which parameters this condition restricts, note that J ¯ w(V )a n dp ¯ w(V )
are decreasing functions. Then, the left-hand side of (5.6) is decreasing in V , and hence
decreasing in b. As a result, (5.6) is satisﬁed if b is bounded below by some number. If I
set b =¯ w, the left-hand side of (5.6) is equal to σk/¯ q,w h i c hi sl e s st h a ny by (5.5). Thus,
there exists ˆ b ∈ (0, ¯ w) such that (5.5) and (5.6) are satisﬁed if b ∈ (ˆ b, ¯ w).
To see what (5.7) entails, note that the left-hand side of (5.7) is a decreasing function
of w for suﬃciently small w. Thus, (5.7) imposes an upper bound on w. Because w is
chosen to be suﬃciently close to 0, a suﬃc i e n tc o n d i t i o nf o r( 5 . 7 )i s :
lim
w↓0 [u(w)+u
0(w)(a − w)] = ∞ for all a>0.
This suﬃcient condition is satisﬁed by the example u(w)=( w1−η − 1)/(1−η)w i t hη > 1.
Deﬁne
Ω = {w(V ):w(V ) is continuous and (weakly) increasing;





w ∈ Ω : w(V ) is strictly increasing for all V<¯ V
o
.
I establish the existence of a ﬁxed point of Γ in Ω a n dt h e ns h o wt h a ti tl i e si nΩ0.F i r s t ,
the following lemma holds:
Lemma 5.1. For any w ∈ Ω, Jw(V ) deﬁned by (5.1) is strictly positive, bounded, strictly
decreasing and continuously diﬀerentiable for all V . The function pw(V ) deﬁned by (5.2)
has all the properties stated in Lemma 3.1.
Proof.L e tw(V ) ∈ Ω.I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tJw(V )d e ﬁned by (5.1) is strictly positive,
bounded, strictly decreasing and continuously diﬀerentiable, with J0(V )=−1/u0(w(V )) <
0. Because w(V ) is non-decreasing, then J0(V ) is non-increasing; i.e., J(V )i s( w e a k l y )
concave. Moreover, Jw(¯ V )=k/¯ q. Similarly, the function pw(V )d e ﬁned by (5.2) is bounded
and continuous for all V (including V = ¯ V ), with pw(¯ V )=P(¯ q)=0 . F o ra l lV<¯ V ,













20where the argument of P0 is k/Jw(V )a n dP0 < 0 under Assumption 2. Moreover, for any






















where the inequality follows from part (iii) of Assumption 2. Because Jw(V ) is decreasing,
the function P0k/Jw(V ) is non-increasing. Because 1/u0(w(V )) is non-decreasing in V and
P0 < 0, then p0
w(V ) is non-increasing. That is, pw(V )i s( w e a k l y )c o n c a v e . Q E D
The above lemma shows that pw(V ) has all the properties that enable parts (i) - (iii)
in Lemma 3.2 to hold. As a result, there is a unique and interior solution to (3.1),
Fw(V ), which is continuous and strictly increasing for all V<¯ V .M o r e o v e r , E0
w(V )=
−pw(Fw(V )) < 0.
The following theorem states the existence of the ﬁxed point of Γ (see Appendix C for
a proof):
Theorem 5.2. Maintain Assumptions 1, 2 and 3. Then, the mapping Γ has a ﬁxed point,
w∗ ∈ Ω0.T h a ti s ,w∗(V ) is continuous on [V , ¯ V ], its values lie in [w, ¯ w] with w∗(¯ V )=¯ w,
and it is strictly increasing for all V<¯ V . The implied functions Jw∗(V ) and pw∗(V ) are
strictly concave, in addition to the properties stated in Lemma 5.1.
In the remainder of this paper, I will suppress the * on the ﬁxed point and the subscripts
w∗ on the functions J, p, F and E.
The above theorem establishes continuity, but not diﬀerentiability, of the wage func-
tion w(V ). However, diﬀerentiability is required for various parts of previous sections. For
example, part (iv) of Lemma 3.2 requires p(V )t ob et w i c ed i ﬀerentiable in order for F0(V )
t oe x i s t ,w h i c hi nt u r nr e q u i r e sw(V )t ob ed i ﬀerentiable. Moreover, the exposition lead-
ing to the equilibrium deﬁnition relied on the supposition that optimal contracts provide
increasing values, as well as increasing wages, to workers over the tenure of employment.
These features are guaranteed if the focus is on wage proﬁles that are smooth over time,
as the following corollary states (see Appendix D for a proof):
Corollary 5.3. If | ˙ w(t)| < ∞ for all t,t h e nw(V ) is diﬀerentiable, with 0 <w 0(V ) < ∞
for all V . Moreover, the following results hold for all V<¯ V : (i) the derivatives J00(V ),
p00(V ) and F0(V ) exist and are ﬁnite; (ii) ˙ V> 0 and ˙ J(V ) < 0.
216. Equilibrium Distributions of Workers and Firms
The functions p(V )a n dF(V ) induce equilibrium distributions of workers and ﬁrms. Let ge
be the density function corresponding to the distribution of employed workers, Ge,a n dgu
be the density function corresponding to the distribution of unemployed workers, Gu.O n c e
these distributions of values are obtained, one can compute other distributions interested
in the literature. For example, the distribution of employed wages, denoted as Gw(w), is
given by Gw(w(V )) = Ge(V ). Because w0(V ) > 0, the density function of employed wages
is gw(w)=ge(V )/w0(V ).
6.1. Unemployment Beneﬁts versus Wages
Let me compare unemployment beneﬁts with wages. To do so, I translate unemployment
beneﬁts into values, using (3.4). That equation solves Vu = Vu(b). Denote the inverse of
this function as b = B(Vu), where
B(V )=u
−1 (σV − λ0E(V )). (6.1)
I will refer to B(V )a st h ebeneﬁtf u n c t i o n . It gives the level of the unemployment beneﬁt
starting at which an unemployed worker can achieve the lifetime value V .I tc a nb ev e r i ﬁed
that V 0
u(b) > 0, and so B0(V ) > 0. Under the assumption ¯ b =¯ w, Vu(¯ b)=¯ V .
Deﬁne
v0 = Vu(b)a n dvj = F
(j)(v0), j =1 ,2,... (6.2)
where F(0)(v0)=v0 and F(j)(v0)=F(F(j−1)(v0)). The support of Gu is [v0, ¯ V ]a n dt h e
support of Ge is [v1, ¯ V ], as depicted in Figure 2 earlier. Clearly, v1 >v 0.M o r e o v e r ,
v0 = V +λ0E(v0)/σ >V. That is, the set of equilibrium values is a strict subset of [V , ¯ V ].
The following lemma compares the beneﬁt function with the wage function:
Lemma 6.1. w(¯ V )=B(¯ V ).I fλ0 ≤ λ1,t h e nw(V ) <B (V ) for all V ∈ [v1, ¯ V ).
Proof.F o ra l lV ∈ [v1, ¯ V ], ˙ V ≥ 0, and so the following holds for all λ0 ≤ λ1:
u(w(V )) = σV − λ1E(V ) − ˙ V ≤ σV − λ0E(V )=u(B(V )).
Thus, w(V ) ≤ B(V ). The inequality is strict when ˙ V> 0, and hence when V<¯ V .Q E D
For an unemployed worker to achieve the same value V as an employed worker, the
unemployment beneﬁt must be higher than the wage. This is true even if an unemployed
22worker has the same access to jobs as an employed worker, i.e., if λ0 = λ1.T h er e a s o nf o r
this result is that an employed worker enjoys the prospect of rising wages while an unem-
ployed worker’s beneﬁt does not change over time. This disadvantage of an unemployed
worker must be compensated by a higher unemployment beneﬁt in order for the unem-
ployed worker to achieve the same value as an employed worker. Note that the comparison
between the unemployment beneﬁt and wage may also hold for some λ0 > λ1.O fc o u r s e ,
if λ0 < λ1, then an unemployed worker has more diﬃcult access to jobs than an employed
worker. In this case, there is an additional reason for B(V ) >w (V ).
The beneﬁt function transforms the exogenous distribution of new entrants over the
beneﬁts into an endogenous distribution over the values. To see this, deﬁne Φ(V )=
H(B(V )). Drawing a beneﬁt b according to the distribution H is equivalent to drawing a
value V according to Φ.B e c a u s eB0(V ) > 0, the density function corresponding to Φ is:
φ(V )=h(B(V ))B
0(V )=
σ + λ0p(F(V ))
u0(B(V ))
h(B(V )). (6.3)
Because h(.), F(.)a n dB(.)a r ed i ﬀerentiable, φ(.)i sd i ﬀerentiable.
6.2. Distribution of Unemployed Workers
Consider the group of unemployed workers whose values are greater than V ,w h e r eV ∈
[v0, ¯ V ]. Equating the ﬂo w si n t ot h i sg r o u pa n do u to ft h i sg r o u pi nas m a l li n t e r v a lo ft i m e
dt, I obtain the following equation:
(σdt){1 − (1 − n)[1− Gu(V )]}[1 − Φ(V )]
=( σdt)(1 − n)[1 − Gu(V )]Φ(V )+λ0(1 − n)
R ¯ V
V [p(F(z))dt]dGu(z).
The left-hand side gives the ﬂow into the group, which is generated by newborns who
replace workers who were not in the group and who just died. The measure of agents who
were not in the described group is {1 − (1 − n)[1− Gu(V )]}. W h e ns u c ha na g e n td i e s
and is replaced by a new agent, the new agent belongs to the described group if the agent
draws a value of leisure higher than V , which occurs with probability 1−Φ(V ). Note that
if agents who just died were in the described group and are replaced by new agents who
draw values above V , such newborns do not change the measure of the group.
T h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo ft h ee q u a t i o ng i v e st h eﬂows out of the group. The ﬁrst term
is caused by death in the group whose replacements draw values less than or equal to V .
The second term is the ﬂow of agents who just exited the group as the result of becoming
employed (at higher values).
23Dividing the two sides of the equation by dt and re-arranging, I obtain:




From this equation one can show that Gu(V ) is continuous and diﬀerentiable for all V ∈
[v0, ¯ V ]. Diﬀerentiating with respect to V ,Ig e t :
gu(V )=
σφ(V )
(1 − n)[σ + λ0p(F(V ))]
. (6.5)
















The following lemma is proven in Appendix D:
Lemma 6.2. Gu(V ) < Φ(V ) for all V ∈ (v0, ¯ V ).
The cause for the result in this lemma is the feature that the employment rate is
decreasing in the worker’s current value. This feature implies that a higher proportion
of unemployed workers at low values transit from unemployment into employment than
unemployed workers at high values. As a result, the distribution of the values of workers
who remain unemployed in the steady state is more skewed toward high values than the
distribution with which unemployed workers start their lives with. A particular implication
of such ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance is that, if H is uniform, then the density function
gu is increasing.
6.3. Distribution of Employed Workers
Examine the group of employed workers whose values are greater than V ,w h e r eV ∈ [v1, ¯ V ].
Since death is the only way to exit from this group, the measure of the outﬂow from this
group in a small interval dt is σn[1 − Ge(V )](dt). There are three ﬂows into the group.
One is the group of workers who were employed at or below V and whose values increased
above V according the contract. The size of this ﬂow is n[Ge(V ) − Ge(V − ˙ Vd t )]. The
second inﬂow is the group of workers who were employed at or below V and who received
24oﬀers above V .T h i s i n ﬂow exists only if the workers’ values before the application are
equal to or greater than v1, i.e., if F−1(V ) ≥ v1; otherwise, the workers were unemployed.
The third inﬂow is the group of unemployed workers who received oﬀers above V .B e f o r e
receiving oﬀers, these workers’ values lie in [F−1(V ), ¯ V ]. Equating the outﬂows to the sum
of inﬂows, and taking the limit dt → 0, I get:
σn[1 − Ge(V )]
= nlimdt↓0







Using (6.4) to substitute for the last term and re-arranging, I get:
limdt↓0
Ge(V )−Ge(V − ˙ Vd t )
dt




Here, ∆ is deﬁned as ∆(V )=[ Φ(V ) − (1 − n)Gu(V )]/n.D e n o t eδ(V )=∆0(V ). Then,
δ(V )=
λ0p(F(V ))φ(V )





Lemma 6.3. Ge does not have a mass point and ge is continuously diﬀerentiable.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that Ge h a sam a s sp o i n ta tav a l u eV ∈ [v1,¯ V ]. Then
lim
dt↓0
Ge(V ) − Ge(V − ˙ Vd t )
dt
= ∞.
This violates (6.8), because the right-hand side of (6.8) is bounded. Thus, Ge does not
have a mass point, and so it is a continuous function. Denote
ge(V−)=l i m
dt↓0
Ge(V ) − Ge(V − dt)
dt
The left-hand side of (6.8) is equal to ge(V−) ˙ V . The right-hand side of (6.8) is a contin-
uous function of V , because Ge, F−1 and p(F(.)) are continuous. Thus, ge(V−) ˙ V must
be continuous. Because ˙ V is also continuous, ge must be continuous. Continuity of ge
implies that Ge is continuously diﬀerentiable. Since F−1 and p(F(.)) are continuously dif-
ferentiable, diﬀerentiability of Ge implies that the right-hand side of (6.8) is continuously
diﬀerentiable. Therefore, ge is continuously diﬀerentiable. QED
With the above lemma, I can rewrite (6.8) as
ge(V ) ˙ V = σ∆(F




25To solve for ge, partition the support of Ge into subintervals [vj,v j+1), where vj is deﬁned
by (6.2). Add a subscript j to ge(V )a n dGe(V )w h e nV ∈ [vj,v j+1). Using the function
T(V )d e ﬁned by (3.11) and δ(V )d e ﬁned by (6.9), I summarize some previous results and
the solution for ge in the following theorem (see Appendix E for a proof):
Theorem 6.4. The density of the equilibrium distribution of unemployed workers is given
by (6.5), the measure of employed workers by (6.7), and the equilibrium density function
of employed workers is given as follows:















where (6.12) holds for j ≥ 2.M o r e o v e r ,gej(vj) = limV →vj ge(j−1)(V ) for all j.
The theorem gives the following procedure to compute ge. Starting with j = 1, (6.11)
gives ge1. Taking the limit V → v2 in the formula yields ge2(v2). Then, setting j =2i n
(6.12) yields ge2(V ). Taking the limit V → v3 in the result yields ge3(v3). Continue this
process until gej is obtained for all j.
The following corollary describes the shape of ge (see Appendix E for a proof):
Corollary 6.5. ge(v1)=0and g0
e(v1) > 0.I f F0(¯ V ) > 0,t h e nge(¯ V )=0 .I n t h i s c a s e ,
there exists ˆ V ∈ (v1, ¯ V ) such g0
e(V ) < 0 for ˆ V< V<¯ V .
Before discussing the result in this corollary, let us see how easily the condition F0(¯ V ) >
0c a nb es a t i s ﬁed. Consider the matching function in Example 2.1. Write the ﬁrst-order
condition of a worker’s application as F−1(V )=V + p(V )/p0(V ). Diﬀerentiating this
condition and evaluating at ¯ V yields dF −1(V )/dV |V =¯ V =1− ρ.T h u s , w i t h t h e C E S
matching function, F0(¯ V ) > 0 is automatically satisﬁed under Assumption 2.
The above corollary says that the density function of employed workers is an increasing
function at low values. In addition, if F0(¯ V ) > 0, the density function is decreasing at
high values. In this case, the density function is non-monotonic. There are more workers
employed at intermediate values than at values at the two ends.
The non-monotonic density of employed values implies a non-monotonic density of
employed wages. To see this, recall that the density of employed wages is gw(w)=
ge(V )/w0(V ). Because 0 <w 0(V ) < ∞ by Lemma 5.3, the above corollary yields gw(w1)=
26gw(¯ w)=0 ,w h e r ew1 = w(v1). Thus, the shape of gw(w)a tt h et w oe n d si ss i m i l a rt ot h e
shape of ge(V ) at the two ends. That is, the density of employed wages is increasing when
wage is low and decreasing when wage is high.
The non-monotonicity of the density function of employed values (or wages) is a robust
feature of the data. However, this feature is not a prediction of the BC model or, more
generally, of any undirected search model with on-the-job search and with homogeneous
matches. Instead, such a model generates monotonically increasing density functions of
employed values. The critical diﬀerence is in the shape of the density function at high
values. While directed search induces the density function to decrease at high values, as
in the data, undirected search induces the density function to increase at high values. To
reverse this unrealistic prediction, an undirected search model needs to introduce suﬃcient
heterogeneity across matches, such as heterogeneity in workers’ or ﬁrms’ productivity.
Directed search generates such a diﬀerent result from undirected search because an
applicant optimally chooses to apply to one target value. Since higher values are also
available to the applicant, applying to the (lower) target value is optimal only if higher
values are more diﬃcult to be obtained than the target value. For this to be true, the
measure of recruiting ﬁrms per applicant must be smaller at high values than at the target
value. In particular, at values close to the upper bound ¯ V , the measure of recruiting ﬁrms
per applicant should be close to zero. In turn, as few workers apply to such high values,
it is indeed optimal for only few ﬁrms to recruit at these values. The measure of workers
who succeed in obtaining jobs at values near ¯ V is close to zero. This feature makes the
density function of employed values decreasing near the upper end of the distribution.
This desirable feature does not exist under undirected search because, then, every
applicant is assumed to send the application randomly and uniformly to the recruiting
ﬁrms. Because ﬁrms cannot use oﬀers to attract applications, they use oﬀers to increase
acceptance and retention. For these purposes, a high value is superior to a low value.
Because all equilibrium oﬀers must yield the same expected value to the ﬁrm, there must
be more ﬁrms recruiting at high values than at low values. This results in more workers
being employed at high values than at low values. In addition, since workers employed at
high values are also less likely to quit than workers employed at low values, the density
function of employed values is increasing under undirected search.
The above diﬀerence can be illustrated with the roles of p(V )a n dq(V ), the Poisson
rates of employment and hiring. A directed search model and an undirected search model
both require zero net expected proﬁt from recruiting at all values, i.e., q(V )=k/J(V ).
With reasonable assumptions, both models produce a decreasing and concave function,
27J(V ), which implies that q(V ) is increasing and convex. The diﬀerence arises in the link
between q(V ) and the distribution of workers. This link is tight when search is undirected.
In that case, a ﬁrm’s hiring rate at V is equal to the rate at which the application comes
from a worker employed below V .T h a ti s ,
λ1nGe(V )+λ0(1 − n)Gu(V )=q(V )
Because q(V ) is convex, then the density functions ge(V )a n dgu(V ) are likely to be both
increasing. Directed search breaks this close link between q and Ge. With directed search,
the critical determinant of the equilibrium distribution of workers is not the hiring rate, but
rather workers’ application decisions which is governed by the function p(V )=P(q(V )).
Although q(V ) is still convex, the function p(V ) is decreasing and concave. In particular,
t h ee m p l o y m e n tr a t ea tv a l u e sc l o s et o¯ V is almost zero. As a result, few workers are
employed at such high values, and so the density of employed workers is decreasing at this
high end of the distribution.
Now an alert reader may notice the heterogeneity in the distribution of unemployment
beneﬁts. Because this heterogeneity is not in the BC model, one might suspect that its
presence also plays a role in creating the non-monotonic density function of employed
workers. This suspicion is not supported. The non-monotonicity of ge occurs regardless of
whether h(b) is increasing, decreasing, ﬂat, or non-monotonic.
As a general matter, it is important to remark that the heterogeneity in unemployment
beneﬁts aﬀects the details of the wage distribution, but eliminating it does not eliminate the
wage dispersion. Even if all workers start their lives with the same unemployment beneﬁt,
the matching process results in only a fraction of them getting jobs initially. Those who
luckily get jobs will continue to apply for higher wages in the future than those who do not
have jobs. This precess continues, and so there will be wage dispersion in the equilibrium.
Moreover, because wages increase with tenure, workers who obtain the same contract at
diﬀerent times will also see wages diﬀer.
6.4. Distribution of Oﬀer Values
Denote the distribution of recruiting ﬁrms as R(V )a n di t sd e n s i t ya sr(V ). Because each
ﬁrm has only one vacancy, R is also the distribution of oﬀers. To compute this distribution,
note that the relative measure of applicants for V to recruiting ﬁrms at V is the tightness
θ(V )=q(V )/p(V ). The measure of workers applying to V is:
A(V )=λ0(1 − n)gu(F






28The measure of ﬁrms recruiting at V is equal to A(V )/θ(V ). Thus, the distribution of













The second integral is the total measure of recruiting ﬁrms.
As the distribution of employed values, the oﬀer distribution is decreasing at high
values. This can be veriﬁed by noting r(¯ V )=0 ,b e c a u s ep(¯ V )=0 . T h er e s u l ti m p l i e s
that the distribution of oﬀe rw a g e si sd e c r e a s i n ga th i g hv a l u e s .
7. Comparative Statics
In this section, I conduct two comparative statics, one with respect to the distribution of the
unemployment beneﬁt and the other with respect to the parameter λ0.T h e s ec o m p a r a t i v e
statics further illustrate the diﬀerences between the current model of directed search and
undirected search models.
Suppose unemployment beneﬁts increase in the sense that the distribution H changes
in the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. Suppose that the support of the distribution does
not change. The eﬀe c t so ft h i sc h a n g ea r es u m m a r i zed in the following corollary:
Corollary 7.1. An increase of the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance in unemployment ben-
eﬁts has no eﬀect on workers’ optimal applications and equilibrium contracts. It does not
aﬀect the supports of the distributions Gu(.) and Ge(.), either, although it aﬀects the shape
of these distribution functions.
Proof. The analysis on equilibrium contracts in section 5 are independent of the
distributions, Ge, Gu and H. Thus, the functions, w(.), p(.), q(.), J(.), F(.), and E(.)a f t e r
the change in H a r ea l lt h es a m ea sb e f o r e .T h ei n d e p e n d e n c eo ft h ef u n c t i o nE(.)o nH
implies that the function Vu(.) is independent of H. Under the assumption that b does
not change, v0 and v1 do not change, either, because v0 = Vu(b)a n dv1 = F(v0). Taken
together, these results imply that the change in H has no eﬀect on a worker’s optimal
application strategy or the equilibrium set of contracts. However, Gu and Ge change with
H because Φ does. QED
The distributions of workers, Ge, Gu and H, do not play any role in the determination
of optimal contracts and optimal application. Although this feature is evident from the
procedure in section 5, it is worthwhile explaining why it arises. To do so, start with a
29worker’s application. For a worker to decide on the optimal application, F(V ), he only
needs the function of the employment rate. In turn, the employment rate must satisfy the
requirement that recruiting should yield zero expected proﬁt at all equilibrium oﬀers. This
requirement pins down p(V ), given a ﬁrm’s value function, J(V ). However, a ﬁrm value
function depends only on what happens after the hiring, that is, on the contract oﬀered,
w(V ), and the worker’s quit rate, p(F(V )). By the proceeding argument, the two functions
that determine the quite rate, p(.)a n dF(.), are only functions of optimal contracts. Thus,
the only thing still to be determined is the set of optimal contracts, i.e., the function w(V ).
The function w(V )p r o v i d e se ﬃcient sharing of the value between a ﬁrm and a worker, in
the sense that − ˙ J = ˙ V/ u 0(w). Again, ˙ J and ˙ V involve only the functions F(V ), p(V ), J(V )
and w(V ) (see (3.3) and (3.5)). The solution to this ﬁxed-point problem is independent of
the distributions of employed and unemployed workers.11
A strong (testable) implication of the above corollary is that changing unemployment
beneﬁts can change wage distributions and the average duration of unemployment, but it
does not change individual workers’ job-to-job transition rates or their wage paths.
The above predictions are markedly diﬀerent from those in undirected search models.12
An increase in unemployment beneﬁts, in the way modelled here, reduces the probability
with which a given oﬀer will be accepted by a worker. This forces the equilibrium dis-
tribution of oﬀers to increase. As more ﬁrms are oﬀering higher values than before, the
transition rate from low-value jobs to high-value jobs increases. That is, the quitting rate
at low-value jobs increases. In order to mitigate this increase in the quitting rate, ﬁrms
oﬀer contracts in which wages increase more quickly with tenure than before. As is clear
from this explanation, the main cause for this diﬀerence in the result is that the oﬀer dis-
tribution plays a critical role in determining workers’ quit rates under undirected search,
but not so under directed search.
Now let me turn to the eﬀects of an increase in λ0, the probability with which an
unemployed worker receives a job application opportunity. Again, the functions w(.), p(.),
q(.), J(.), F(.), and E(.), are all unaﬀected, because the analysis in section 5 does not
11There are two qualiﬁcations. First, the distribution H can aﬀect equilibrium contracts if the number
of ﬁrms is ﬁxed in ths short run, rather than being determined by competitive entry. In that case, a ﬁrm’s
expected value from recruiting is endogenous, rather than being given by the vacancy cost k.A l le ﬀects
of the distributions on equilibrium contracts come through this expected value of recruiting, and these
eﬀects vanish in the long run when entry becomes competitive. Second, if there is exogenous separation
between a worker-ﬁrm pair and the worker returns to unemployment after such exogenous separation, then
the increase in unemployment beneﬁts will aﬀect optimal contracts by aﬀecting the equation for ˙ V .
12O n ec a nv e r i f yt h es t a t e m e n t sh e r eb yi n t r o d u c i n g a continuous distribution of unemployment beneﬁts
into BC or Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
30depend on λ0. However, the function Vu(.)d o e sd e p e n do nλ0.A ni n c r e a s ei nλ0 increases
Vu(b)f o ra n yg i v e nb.T h u s ,v0 increases, and so does v1. The distributions of unemployed
and employed workers change as well.
The increases in λ0 has only a limited eﬀect on the job-to-job transition rate and the
wage path. To see this, let ˆ v1 be the new level of v1 after the increase in λ0.B e c a u s e
w(.), p(.)a n dq(.) are unaﬀected, the optimal baseline contract after the increase in λ0 is
the part of the original baseline contract from ˆ v1 onward. Put diﬀerently, the new set of
optimal contracts is identical to the subset of the original contracts whose starting values
are equal to or greater than ˆ v1. Therefore, the job-to-job transition rate and the wage
path of a worker to whom the contract provides ˆ v1 or more do not change. Again, these
results contrast with those in undirected search models, where an increase in λ0 increases
t h ej o b - t o - j o bt r a n s i t i o nr a t ea n dt h es t e e p n e s so ft h ew a g ep a t h .
The comparative statics above have obvious policy implications. If policymakers at-
tempt to aﬀect the labor market outcomes of employed workers, changing the aspects of
the market for unemployed workers would be a wrong place to put the resource. Instead,
the policy should directly target the aspects of the labor market relevant for employed
workers, such as λ1.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the equilibrium in a labor market where ﬁrms oﬀer wage-tenure
contracts to direct the search of employed and unemployed workers. Each applicant ob-
serves all oﬀers and there is no coordination among individuals. Because search is directed,
workers’ applications (as well as ﬁrms’ recruiting decisions) must be optimal. This opti-
mality requires the equilibrium to be formulated diﬀerently from the that in the large
literature of undirected search. I provide such a formulation and show that the equilib-
rium exists. In the equilibrium, individuals explicitly tradeoﬀ b e t w e e na no ﬀer and the
matching rate at that oﬀer. This tradeoﬀ yields a unique oﬀer which is optimal for each
worker to apply. Despite this uniqueness and directed search, the stationary equilibrium
has a non-degenerate and continuous distribution of wages.
One cause of wage dispersion in the model is the feature that the optimal application
increases with the value that a worker’s current state yields. Even if all workers were
initially identical, those who obtained jobs earlier will apply to higher wages than those
who obtain jobs later. In the stationary equilibrium, a continuum of values are oﬀered,
each of which is tailored to workers who have a particular current value. The other cause of
31the wage distribution is the wage-tenure contract. With risk-averse workers and imperfect
capital markets, it is optimal for a ﬁrm to oﬀer a wage proﬁle that increases smoothly with
tenure. Such a contract provides partial insurance to the worker and backloads wages to
increase retention of the worker. The positive wage-tenure relationship implies that workers
who are employed under the same contract but at diﬀerent times may earn diﬀerent wages.
It also implies that the quit rate falls with tenure.
The model generates several novel implications. First, because applicants separate
themselves according to their current values, wage mobility is endogenously limited by the
workers’ current wages. Second, the density function of the wage distribution of employed
workers over wages is increasing at low wages and decreasing at high wages, even when all
worker-ﬁrm pairs are equally productive. Finally, an increase in unemployment beneﬁts
has no eﬀect on the set of equilibrium contracts or individual workers’ job-to-job transition
rates, although it aﬀects wage distributions of workers.
These diﬀerences are clearly testable. In addition, the model provides a tight link
between the unobserved distribution of oﬀers and the observed distribution of employed
wages. Because each worker’s application is optimal, every match results in a formation
of a ﬁrm-worker relationship. There is no oﬀer which is received by a worker but which is
not taken. If a worker applies to an oﬀer, then the oﬀer is acceptable. This means that a
worker’s duration with a job is simply equal to the duration in which the worker fails to get
an oﬀer. This property allows one to use the duration data and the observed distribution
of wages to back out the distribution of oﬀe r s . T h ep r o c e d u r em a ye v e nb ew o r k a b l e
when there is unobserved heterogeneity across matches. As Barlevy (2003) discusses, the
distribution of oﬀers is useful for a range of issues, but it cannot be easily identiﬁed in
undirected search models. One cause of the diﬃculty is that, with random search, an oﬀer
that is received by a worker may not be acceptable to the worker.
A useful extension will be to incorporate heterogeneity across ﬁrms and workers. If
workers diﬀer in productivity, then ﬁrms may rank the applicants according to productivity,
as Shi (2002) and Shimer (2005) have shown in simpler environments. If ﬁrms are diﬀerent
in productivity, then they may provide diﬀerent wage-tenure contracts. Such an extension
will undoubtedly be challenging, but it will bring the model closer to the data.
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A. Proof of Lemma 3.2
The result F(¯ V )=¯ V is evident. Let V<¯ V in the following proof. Temporarily denote
K(f,V)=p(f)(f − V ). Because p(.) is continuous and bounded, as stated in Lemma
3.1, K(f,V) is continuous and bounded. Thus, the maximization problem in (3.1) has a
solution. Because p(¯ V )=0 ,Ih a v eK(¯ V,V)=0=K(V,V). Since any interior value of f
gives a positive value of K(f,V), then the solution is interior. To show that the solution
is unique, I show that K(f,V) is strictly concave in f for all f ∈ (V, ¯ V ). To do so, let
α ∈ (0,1). Let f1 and f2 be two arbitrary interior values with f2 >f 1 >V .D e n o t e
fα = αf1 +( 1− α)f2. Then,
K(fα,V)= p(fα)[α(f1 − V )+( 1− α)(f2 − V )]
≥ [αp(f1)+( 1− α)p(f2)][α(f1 − V )+( 1− α)(f2 − V )]
= αK(f1,V)+( 1− α)K(f2,V)+α(1 − α)[p(f1) − p(f2)][f2 − f1]
> αK(f1,V)+( 1− α)K(f2,V).
The two equalities come from rewriting, the ﬁrst inequality from the concavity of p,a n d
the last inequality from the strictly decreasing property of p.T h u s , K(f,V) is strictly
concave in f and part (i) in the Lemma is established.
For part (ii), uniqueness of the solution implies that F(.) is continuous by the Theorem
of the Maximum. To show that E(.)i sd i ﬀerentiable, let V1 and V2 be two arbitrary values
with V1 <V 2 < ¯ V .E x p r e s s Fi = F(Vi)f o ri =1 ,2. Uniqueness of the solution implies
K(F1,V 1) >K (F2,V 1)a n dK(F2,V 2) >K (F1,V 2). Thus,
E(V2) − E(V1) >K (F1,V 2) − K(F1,V 1)=−p(F1)(V2 − V1);
E(V2) − E(V1) <K (F2,V 2) − K(F2,V 1)=−p(F2)(V2 − V1).
Divide the two inequalities by (V2 − V1) and take the limit V2 → V1.B e c a u s e F(.)i s
continuous, the limit shows that E(V )i sd i ﬀerentiable at V1 and that E0(V1)=−p(F1).
Since V1 is arbitrary, this argument establishes part (ii) for all V<¯ V .
For part (iii), again take two arbitrary values V1 and V2,w i t hV1 <V 2 ≤ ¯ V . Then,
p(Fj)(Fj − Vi) <p (Fi)(Fi − Vi)f o rj 6= i.Ih a v e :
0 > [p(F2)(F2 − V1) − p(F1)(F1 − V1)] + [p(F1)(F1 − V2) − p(F2)(F2 − V2)]
= p(F2)(V2 − V1)+p(F1)(V1 − V2)=[ p(F2) − p(F1)](V2 − V1).
This result implies p(F2) <p (F1). Because p(.) is strictly decreasing, F(V2) >F(V1).
Because p is continuously diﬀerentiable, F(V )i sg i v e nb yt h eﬁrst-order condition of
the maximization problem, which leads to (3.2). Furthermore, if p is twice diﬀerentiable,
then diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order condition generates the derivative F0(V ) > 0. Concavity
of p yields F0(V ) ≤ 1/2. Finally, E00(V )=−p0(F(V ))F0(V ). QED
33B .P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . 3
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 yield p0(F(V )) < 0a n dF0(V ) > 0f o ra l lV<¯ V . Because J(V ) > 0
for all V , as shown later, then (3.8) implies ˙ w(t) > 0f o ra l lV<¯ V .
Because ¯ V is the highest value oﬀered, then p(F(¯ V )) = 0 and ˙ V =0a tV = ¯ V .T h e n
E(¯ V ) = 0, and (3.3) implies ¯ V = u(¯ w)/σ. Similarly, because ˙ J(¯ V )=0 ,( 3 . 5 )i m p l i e s
J(¯ V )=( y − ¯ w)/σ. Because recruiting at ¯ w should yield zero net proﬁt, q(¯ V )J(¯ V )=k;
that is, ¯ w = y −σk/q(¯ V ). If q(¯ V )=¯ q, then the stated expressions for ¯ w and J(¯ V ) follow.
Since ¯ q<∞ by Assumption 2, then ¯ w<yand J(¯ V ) > 0.
To show q(¯ V )=¯ q,s u p p o s et h a tq(¯ V )=¯ q − δ to the contrary, where δ > 0. Because
q(¯ V )J(¯ V )=k>0a n dJ(¯ V )=( y − ¯ w)/σ,t h e n¯ w = y − σk/(¯ q − δ). Consider a ﬁrm
that deviates from ¯ w to ¯ w + ε,w h e r eε > 0, which generates a value to a worker as
ˆ V = u(¯ w + ε)/σ.B e c a u s et h eﬁrm is the only one that oﬀers a wage higher than ¯ w,t h e
workers who are employed at ¯ w will all apply to this ﬁrm, which yields q(ˆ V )=¯ q.T h e
ﬁrm’s expected value of recruiting is q(ˆ V )J(ˆ V )=( y − ¯ w − ε)¯ q/σ, which exceeds k for
suﬃciently small ε > 0. This result contradicts the statement that ¯ V is an equilibrium
value. Thus, q(¯ V )=¯ q.Q E D
C .P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 . 2
The sets Ω and Ω0 are deﬁned prior to Lemma 5.1 and the mapping Γ is deﬁned by w1(V )=
(Γw)(V ), where w1 is the solution to (5.3). It can be veriﬁed that Ω is a closed and convex
set. Lemmas C.1 and C.2 below state that Γ : Ω → Ω0 is a continuous mapping in the
supnorm. Then, Γ has a ﬁxed point in Ω, denoted as w∗.B e c a u s ew∗(V )=( Γw∗)(V ) ∈ Ω0,
then w∗(V ) is strictly increasing for all V<¯ V .T h i si m p l i e st h a tJw∗(V )a n dpw∗(V )a r e
strictly concave, in addition to the properties stated in Lemma 5.1.
Lemma C.1. Γ : Ω → Ω0 ⊂ Ω.
Proof. Temporarily denote the left-hand side of (5.3) as L(w1)a n dt h er i g h t - h a n ds i d e
R(V ). Recall that ¯ w<y . Because L(w) is continuous and strictly decreasing for all w<y ,
it is invertible for all w ∈ [w, ¯ w]. Then, w1 = L−1(R(V )) ≡ w1(V ). I show that w ∈ Ω =⇒
w1 ∈ Ω0. This is done in the following steps.
First, w1(V ) is continuous because Jw(.), pw(.)a n dFw(.) are all continuous.
Second, w1(V ) is strictly increasing for all V<¯ V . To establish this property is equiv-
alent to showing that R(V ) is strictly decreasing for all V<¯ V . Pick arbitrary values V1
and V2,w i t hV ≤ V1 <V 2 < ¯ V . Then,
R(V2) − R(V1)= [ u0(w(V2)) − u0(w(V1))][σ + λ1pw(Fw(V2))]Jw(V2)
+u0(w(V1))λ1Jw(V2)[pw(Fw(V2)) − pw(Fw(V1))] + D (C.1)
where
D = u
0(w(V1))[σ + λ1pw(Fw(V1))]Jw(V2)+σ(V2 − V1) − λ1 [Ew(V2) − E(V1)]
34Because pw(V ) is strictly decreasing as in Lemma 5.1, Fw(V ) is strictly increasing, and so
u0(w(V2)) ≤ u0(w(V1)) and pw(F(V2)) <p w(F(V1)). The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side
of (C.1) is non-positive and the second term is negative. If D ≤ 0, then R(V2) <R (V1),
as desired. To show D ≤ 0, note that Jw(V )a n dEw(V )a r ed i ﬀerentiable by Lemmas 5.1
and 3.1. , Then, D is diﬀerentiable with respect to V2.U s i n gE0
w(V )=−pw(Fw(V )) and
J0
w(V )=−1/u0(w(V )), I can calculate the derivative as:
∂D
∂V2




Because u0(w(V1)) ≥ u0(w(V2)) and pw(Fw(V1)) >p w(Fw(V2)), then ∂D/∂V2 < 0 for all
V2 < ¯ V .T h u s ,D>D |V2=V1 =0f o ra l lV2 ∈ (V1, ¯ V ).
Third, w1(V ) ∈ [w, ¯ w] for all V ,w i t hw1(¯ V )=¯ w.E x a m i n ew1(¯ V ). Because w(¯ V )=¯ w,
then (5.3) implies:
L(w1(¯ V )) = R(¯ V )=u
0(¯ w)(y − ¯ w)+u(¯ w)=L(¯ w).
Because L(w) is strictly decreasing, the above equation implies w1(¯ V )=¯ w.S i n c ew1(V )
is strictly increasing for V<¯ V ,t h e nw1(V ) < ¯ w for all V<¯ V .
Finally, I show w1(V ) ≥ w.S i n c eL0(w) < 0, w1(V ) ≥ w if and only if L(w) ≥ R(V ).
As u ﬃcient condition is L(w) ≥ R(V ), because R(V ) is decreasing function. Note that the
following holds:
R(V )= u0(w(V ))[σ + λ1pw(Fw(V ))]Jw(V )+σV − λ1Ew(V )
<u 0(w)[σ + λ1pw(Fw(V ))]Jw(V )+u(b)
≤ u0(w)[σ + λ1pw(V )]Jw(V )+u(b)
≤ u0(w)[σ + λ1p ¯ w(V )]J ¯ w(V )+u(b)
The ﬁrst inequality follows from the facts that w(V ) ≥ w, V = u(b)/σ and Ew(V ) > 0.
The second inequality follows from the facts that Fw(V ) ≥ V and that pw(.) is decreasing.
To obtain the third inequality, note that Jw(V ) ≤ J ¯ w(V )a n dpw(V ) ≤ p ¯ w(V ) for all V .
Therefore, a suﬃcient condition for w1(V ) ≥ w is:
L(w) ≥ u
0(w)[σ + λ1p ¯ w(V )]J ¯ w(V )+u(b)
This condition can be re-arranged as (5.7), which is assumed to hold. This completes the
proof of Lemma C.1.
Lemma C.2. Γ is continuous in the supnorm.
Proof. To show that the mapping Γ is continuous in the supnorm, I show that the
following holds for all wa,w b ∈ Ω and all V :
|(Γwa)(V ) − (Γwb)(V )| ≤ Akwa − wbk, (C.2)
where the norm is the supnorm and A>0i saﬁnite constant. Once this is done, then
kΓwa − Γwbk =s u p|(Γwa)(V ) − (Γwb)(V )| ≤ Akwa − wbk,
35which implies that Γ is continuous in the supnorm.
To show (C.2), take arbitrarily wa,w b ∈ Ω and V ∈ [V , ¯ V ]. Without loss of generality,
assume wa(V ) ≥ wb(V )f o rt h eg i v e nv a l u eV . Shorten the subscript wi on J, p, F,a n dE
to i,w h e r ei = a,b. Also, denote the right-hand side of (5.3) with w = wi(V )a sRi(V ).
Because w ≥ wL > 0, Assumption 1 implies that there are positive and ﬁnite constants ω1
and ω2 such that ω1 ≤ |u00(w)| ≤ ω2 for all w ∈ [w, ¯ w]. Then
|L
0(w)| =( y − w)|u
00| ≥ (y − ¯ w)ω1 ≡ A1.
Note that A1 is bounded above 0. Since L(w) is decreasing, then
|Ra(V ) − Rb(V )| = |L(Γwa(V )) − L(Γwb(V ))| ≥ A1 |Γwa(V ) − Γwb(V )|.
Now, consider |Ra(V ) − Rb(V )|. Suppressing the given V ,Ih a v e :
|Ra − Rb| = |{[u0(wa) − u0(wb)]Ja + u0(wb)(Ja − Jb)}[σ + λ1pa(Fa)]
+ λ1u0(wb)Jb [pa(Fa) − pb(Fb)] − λ1 [Ea − Eb]|
≤ [|u0(wa) − u0(wb)|Ja + u0(wb)|Ja − Jb|][σ + λ1pa(Fa)]
+λ1u0(wb)Jb|pa(Fa) − pb(Fb)| + λ1 |Ea − Eb|
I ﬁnd the bound on each of the absolute values in the above expression.
Because u00 < 0, then
|u
0(wa) − u
0(wb)| ≤ |wa − wb|max{|u
00(wa)|,|u
00(wb)|} ≤ ω2 kwa − wbk (C.3)
By the deﬁnition of Jw,














V |wa(z) − wb(z)|dz ≤
ω2(¯ V −V )
[u0(¯ w)]2 kwa − wbk
(C.4)
The coeﬃcient of kwa − wbk is bounded because u0(¯ w) > 0a n dω2 < ∞.
To develop bounds on |pa(Fa) − pb(Fb)| and |Ea − Eb|, assume kwa − wbk = ε > 0
with loss of generality. (If kwa − wbk =0 ,t h e nwa = wb for all V ,i nw h i c hc a s e
|pa(Fa) − pb(Fb)| = |Ea − Eb| = kwa − wbk; these provide the required bounds.) I examine
two cases separately: the case where V is close to ¯ V and the case where V is suﬃciently
away from ¯ V . The separation is necessary because P0(q)a n dP00(q) might be unbounded
at q =¯ q (i.e., at V = ¯ V ).
Consider ﬁrst the case where V is close to ¯ V .I nt h i sc a s e ,Fa(V )a n dFb(V )a r ec l o s e
to ¯ V . Because pw(V ) is continuous for all V , including V = ¯ V . then for given ε > 0, there
exists δ > 0 such that
¯ V − V< δ =⇒
¯ ¯ ¯pi(Fi) − pi(¯ V )
¯ ¯ ¯ < ε/2, for i ∈ {a,b}
Because pi(¯ V ) = 0, the following holds for V>¯ V − δ:
|pa(Fa) − pb(Fb)| ≤ |pa(Fa)| + |pb(Fb)| < ε = kwa − wbk (C.5)
36|Ea − Eb| ≤ |pa(Fa)|(Fa − V )+|pb(Fb)|(Fb − V ) < (¯ V − V )kwa − wbk (C.6)
For the last inequality, I used the facts that |pi(Fi)| < ε/2a n dt h a tFi−Vi ≤ ¯ V −V .( C . 5 )
and (C.6) provide the required bounds when V>¯ V − δ.
Now consider the case where V ≤ ¯ V − δ,w h e r eδ > 0. In this case, q<¯ q,a n d
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These absolute values are bounded above in the current case. Let A2 and A3 be the upper
bounds. Deﬁne
A4 = A2
ω2(¯ V − V )
[u0(¯ w)]
2 < ∞
For any x ∈ [V , ¯ V − δ],
|pa(x) − pb(x)| ≤ A2 |Ja(x) − Jb(x)| ≤ A4 kwa − wbk






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ A3 |Ja − Jb|














¯ ¯ ¯ 1
u0(wa) − 1
u0(wb)








[u0(¯ w)]2 |u0(wa) − u0(wb)| + A3
u0(¯ w) |Ja − Jb|
≤ A4
¯ V −V kwa − wbk +
A4A3/A2
u0(¯ w) kwa − wbk
Suppose ﬁrst that Fa ≥ Fb.I fpa(Fa) ≥ pb(Fb), then
0 ≤ pa(Fa) − pb(Fb) ≤ pa(Fa) − pb(Fa) ≤ A4 kwa − wbk
The second inequality comes from the fact that p is decreasing and the last inequality from
the bound on |pa − pb| just derived. If pa(Fa) <p b(Fb), then
0 <p b(Fb) − pa(Fa)=−p0
b(Fb)(Fb − V )+p0
a(Fa)(Fa − V )
≤ (Fa − V )[p0
a(Fa) − p0






A3(¯ V −V )
A2u0(¯ w)
i
A4 kwa − wbk
The equality follows from the ﬁrst-order condition for F, the second inequality from the
supposition Fa ≥ Fb, the third inequality from the facts that p0 is a decreasing function
37and that Fa − V ≤ ¯ V − V , and the last inequality from the bound on |p0
a − p0
b|.T h u s ,i f
Fa ≥ Fb,t h e n
|pa(Fa) − pb(Fb)| ≤
"
1+
A3(¯ V − V )
A2u0(¯ w)
#
A4 kwa − wbk (C.7)
Suppose now that Fa <F b. By switching the roles of Fa and Fb,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a t
(C.7) continues to hold. Thus, (C.7) holds for arbitrary Fa(V )a n dFb(V )w i t hV ≤ ¯ V −δ.
Now let us examine |Ea − Eb| for the case V ≤ ¯ V − δ.I fEa ≥ Eb,t h e n
0 ≤ Ea − Eb = pa(Fa)(Fa − V ) − pb(Fb)(Fb − V )
≤ pa(Fa)(Fa − V ) − pb(Fa)(Fa − V )
=( Fa − V )[pa(Fa) − pb(Fa)] ≤ (¯ V − V )A4 kwa − wbk
The ﬁrst equality comes from the deﬁnition of E(V ), the second inequality from the fact
that pb(f)(f −V ) is maximized at f = Fb, the last inequality from the bound on |pa − pb|
derived above and the fact Fa − V ≤ ¯ V − V . The same result holds if Ea <E b.T h u s ,
|Ea − Eb| ≤ (¯ V − V )A4 kwa − wbk (C.8)
Deﬁning A5 =m a x {A4,1} and replace A4 in (C.7) and (C.8) with A5. The resulting
bounds on |pa − pb| and |Ea − Eb| apply for both the case V>¯ V − δ and V ≤ ¯ V − δ.
Substituting these bounds, (C.3) and (C.4), I have:











A3(¯ V −V )
A2u0(¯ w)
´
Jb + λ1(¯ V − V )
io
kwa − wbk
Let A6 be the maximum value of the coeﬃcient of kwa − wbk in the above expression,
taken over V ∈ [V , ¯ V ]. Then, A6 is bounded above. Setting A = A6/A1 establishes the
inequality (C.2), which shows that Γ is continuous in the supnorm. This completes the
proof of Lemma C.2, and hence of Theorem 5.2. QED
D. Proofs of Corollary 5.3 and Lemma 6.2
To prove Corollary 5.3, suppose that | ˙ w(t)| < ∞ for all t.T h a ti s ,˙ w(V (t)) is ﬁnite. If ˙ V 6=
0, then w0(V )= ˙ w/ ˙ V exists and is ﬁnite. If ˙ V =0a tV1, then, σV1−u(w(V1))−λ1E(V1)=0 .






That is, w(V )i sd i ﬀerentiable at V1. This argument applies to ¯ V ,b e c a u s e ˙ V =0a tV = ¯ V .
Thus, w0(V1)e x i s t sa n di sﬁnite for all V . From (5.1), (5.2) and Lemma 3.2, one can then
verify that J00(V ), p00(V )a n dF0(V )a l le x i s ta n da r eﬁnite for all V<¯ V .
I still need to show that w0(V ) > 0, ˙ V> 0a n d ˙ J(V ) < 0i nt h ec a s eV<¯ V .I n
this case, F(V ) < ¯ V . Lemma 3.2 implies dp(F(V ))/dV < 0. The right-hand side of (3.8)
38is positive and ﬁnite, which implies ˙ w(V ) > 0. Thus, w0(V ) ˙ V ∈ (0,∞)f o ra l lV<¯ V .
Because w(V ) is strictly increasing for all V<¯ V and ˙ V is bounded (see (3.3)), then
w0(V ) ∈ (0,∞)a n d ˙ V ∈ (0,∞)f o ra l lV<¯ V . Finally, ˙ J(V )=J0(V ) ˙ V ∈ (0,∞)f o ra l l
V<¯ V . This completes the proof of Corollary 5.3.
To prove Lemma 6.2, temporarily denote D(V )=Φ(V ) − Gu(V ). Then, D(v0)=











σ + λp(F(V ))
#
.
Examine the expression in [.]. Because p(F(V )) is strictly decreasing in V for all V<¯ V ,
the expression is strictly decreasing in V for such V . Similarly, the expression is positive
at V = v0 and negative at V = ¯ V . Thus, there exists va ∈ (v0, ¯ V )s u c ht h a tD0(V ) > 0
for v0 ≤ V< v a,a n dt h a tD0(V ) < 0f o rva <V ≤ ¯ V .T h u s , f o r a l l V ∈ (v0, ¯ V ),
D(V ) > min{D(v0),D(¯ V )} =0 . Q E D
E. Proofs of Theorem 6.4 and Corollary 6.5
Ip r o v eT h e o r e m6 . 4ﬁrst. Given the analysis leading to the theorem, it is only necessary
to establish (6.11) and (6.12). For V ∈ [v1,v 2), F−1(V ) <v 1, and so (6.10) becomes:
ge1(V ) ˙ V = σ∆(F
−1(V )) − σGe1(V ) − λ1
Z V
v1
p(F(z))dGe1(z)( E . 1 )
Setting V = v1 in (E.1) leads to ge1(v1)=0 . D i ﬀerentiate (E.1) and divide the result by
γ(T(V ),0), where γ is deﬁned by (3.6) and T by (3.11). I have:
g0















The deﬁnition of T(V ) implies T0(V )=1 / ˙ V . Then, it can be veriﬁed that the left-hand
side of (E.2) is equal to the derivative of the function, ge1(V ) ˙ V/ γ(T(V ),0), with respect
to V . Integrate (E.2) from v1 to V .U s i n gt h ef a c tγ(T(V ),0)/γ(T(z),0) = γ(T(V ),T(z))
to rewrite the result, I have (6.11). Since ge is continuous, taking the limit V ↑ v2 in (6.11)
gives ge(v2).
Now examine the case V ∈ [vj,v j+1), where j ≥ 2. In this case, F−1(V ) ≥ v1,a n ds o
(6.10) becomes
gej(V ) ˙ V = σ∆(F
−1(V )) − σGen(V ) − λ1
Z V
F−1(V )
p(F(z))dGe(z)( E . 3 )
39I do not add the subscript j to Ge on the right-hand side of the equation because, if
vj <V <v j+1,s o m ea p p l i c a n t st ov a l u e sa b o v eV come from the interval [vj,V)w h i l e
others come from the interval [F−1(V ),v j). Diﬀerentiating (6.10) yields:
g
0





where a(V )a n db(V )a r ed e ﬁned as before. Using the same procedure as the one used to





























γ (T(V ),T(vj))γ(T(vj),T(z)) = γ(T(V ),T(z)).
Using this fact and the above formulas for gej(V )a n dgej(vj) ,o n ec a nc o m p u t et h el e f t - h a n d
side of (6.12) and show that it is equal to the right-hand side. Because ge is continuous,
then gej(vj) = limV →vj ge(j−1)(V ), all j. This completes the proof of Theorem 6.4.
Now, turn to Corollary 6.5. I have shown ge(v1) = 0 in the above proof. Because
0 <F 0(V ) ≤ 1/2 for all V<¯ V ,t h e ndF−1(V )/dV > 0f o ra l lV<¯ V .A l s o ,˙ V> 0a n d
δ(V ) > 0f o ra l lV<¯ V . These features imply that b(V ) > 0f o ra l lV<¯ V . Substituting
this result and ge(v1)=0i n t o( E . 4 )y i e l d sg0
e(v1) > 0.
Supposing F0(¯ V ) > 0, I now show that ge(¯ V ) = 0. The supposition F0(¯ V ) > 0i m p l i e s
that dF−1(V )/dV is bounded. Because p(¯ V ) = 0, then regardless of whether ¯ V = v2,t h e
following holds (see (E.2) and (E.4)):
g
0
e(¯ V ) ˙ V |V =¯ V + a(¯ V )ge(¯ V )=b(¯ V )
The ﬁrst term is zero because ˙ V =0a tV = ¯ V . Since (D.1) holds for V1 = ¯ V ,t h e n
d ˙ V
dV
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
V =¯ V
= σ + λ1p(F(¯ V )) − u
0(w(¯ V ))w
0(¯ V )=0 .
This implies a(¯ V )=σ.B e c a u s ep(F(¯ V )) = 0, then δ(¯ V ) = 0. In addition, dF−1(V )/dV is
ﬁnite at V = ¯ V .T h u s ,b(¯ V ) = 0. The above form of (E.4) at V = ¯ V becomes 0 = −σge(¯ V ),
i.e., ge(¯ V )=0 .
The feature g0
e(v1) > 0i m p l i e st h a tge(v1 + ε) > 0, where ε > 0i ss u ﬃciently small.
Because ge(V ) is continuous and ge(¯ V )=0 ,t h e nge(V ) must be decreasing when V is close
to ¯ V . That is, there exists ˆ V ∈ (v1, ¯ V ) such that g0
e(V ) < 0f o rˆ V< V<¯ V .Q E D
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